Message Text

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P R 141500Z MAR 77 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4795 INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2977

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, CSCE, SHUM, UR, US

SUBJECT: CSCE IMPLEMENTATION: SEVENTH MEETING WITH SOVIETS

REF: 76 MOSCOW 19609

- 1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR MET WITH MFA DEPUTY KORNIYENKO AT LATTER'S REQUEST MARCH 1. IN GIVING DETAILED RESPONSES TO OUR DECEMBER 14, 1976, DEMARCHE KORNIYENKO REPEATED PREVIOUS ASSERTIONS, OFFERED A FEW CRUMBS. BUT ALTHOUGH MEETING WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND THE DOOR LEFT OPEN FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE, SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON KEY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES OVER PAST TWO MONTHS HAS BEEN RETROGRADE AND WE SEE LITTLE HOPE OF REAL PROGRESS IN THIS AREA BEFORE THE JUNE BELGRADE MEETING. END SUMMARY.
- 2. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS MADE ORALLY MARCH 1 BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO TO AMBASSADOR IN RESPONSE TO OUR DECEMBER 14 CSCE DEMARCHE (REFTEL):
- 3. GENERAL REMARKS: IN GENERAL, SOVIETS REACTED POSITIVELY TO OUR DECEMBER DEMARCHE AND AFFIRM THAT THEY ARE ALSO PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT ALL PORTIONS OF THE FINAL CONFIDENTIAL

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ACT. IN IMPLEMENTING THOSE PROVISIONS, SOVIETS ATTACH GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO "MAJOR POLITICAL QUESTIONS" WHICH FLOW FROM CSCE.

4. NON FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
SOVIETS PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON THIS PROPOSAL
AND REGRET THAT NO FORMAL U.S. REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED.
WHEN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT NATO RESPONSE CONSTITUTED
DEFINITIVE REPLY, KORNIYENKO SAID IT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN
TAKEN HASTILY AND HOPED THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE RE-EXAMINED.

5. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF BASKETS:

U.S. SEEMS TO PLACE DISPROPORTIONATE EMPHASIS
ON BASKET III. U.S. DEMARCHE SPEAKS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE
OF COOPERATION "IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS" IN
KEEPING WITH U.S. NATURAL TRADITION, AND WHEREAS U.S.
MADE ONLY TWO SMALL SUGGESTIONS FOR BASKET I, IT MADE SIX
TIMES AS MANY FOR BASKET III. SOVIETS' HISTORICAL TRADITIONS,
INCLUDING WORLD WAR II TRAGEDY, COMPEL THEM TO PLACE FIRST
PRIORITY ON SECURITY PROVISIONS ALTHOUGH THEY PLACE
"EQUAL EMPHASIS" ON OTHER BASKETS.

6. SPECIFIC U.S. PROPOSALS AND REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS:
BASKET I: A AND B: EXCHANGES OF LECTURERS
AND DELEGATIONS FROM SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES. THESE TWO
"MINOR" U.S. PROPOSALS ARE WELCOME AND POSITIVE REPLY WILL
BE COMMUNICATED BY MOD TO DATT (SEE MOSCOW 2826).
BASKET II:

A. BUSINESS CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. REAL PROGRESS DEPENDS ON ELIMINATION OF U.S. DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES WHICH U.S. HAS NO MORAL RIGHT TO IMPOSE. FRANKLY, THE SOVIETS SEE NO EVIDENCE OF REAL U.S. EFFORTS SINCE LAST YEAR. TO THE CONTRARY, SOVIETS SEE A DISTINCT ABSENCE OF EFFORTS SINCE AUGUST 1976. SOVIETS HAVE LIVED WITH THIS SITUATION AND ARE NOT BEGGING FOR U.S. FAVORS. BALL IS IN U.S. COURT.

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B. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION.
SOVIETS HAVE STARTED TO EXPAND ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION IN THEIR TRADE JOURNALS. MORE AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION IS ALSO BEING MADE AVAILABLE.

C. BUSINESS CONTACTS AND FACILITIES.

SOME 24 OR 25 U.S. CORPORATIONS AND BANKS NOW HAVE OFFICES IN MOSCOW, MORE THAN FOR OTHER COUNTRIES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT TRADE TURNOVER WITH USSR OF THESE FIRMS IS LESS THAN TURNOVER OF THIRD COUNTRY FIRMS. PRACTICALLY ALL U.S. FIRMS REPRESENTED HAVE PERMANENT FACILITIES.

SOME FIRMS ARE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED, BUT THESE CASES ARE BEING RESOLVED. SOME THOUGHT MUST NOW BE GIVEN TO THE REAL MEANING OF FIRMS' PRESENCE SINCE THEY WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT TRADE WOULD SOLIDIFY AND BECOME LARGE SCALE. ("DON'T MISUNDERSTAND ME, BUT AFTER ALL THE IDEA WAS TO EXPAND TRADE.") MEANWHILE, ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET ENTERPRISE REPRESENTATIONS IN U.S. (E.G. TRAKTOREXPORT IN MILWAUKEE AND LITSENZINTORG IN NEW YORK) LONG REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

D. U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR CONFERENCES ON ENERGY, TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT. U.S. SAYS IT IS STUDYING THESE PROPOSALS BUT A LONG TIME HAS ALREADY ELAPSED. SOVIET SIDE ALSO ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO ECE ROLE, BUT WANTS IT TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION.

E. TOURISM. DEVELOPMENT OF INCREASED
SOVIET TOURISM IN USA IS CONTRAINED BY ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL
CONSIDERATIONS. TOURIST COSTS ARE MUCH HIGHER IN USA
THAN USSR AND SOVIETS HAVE LIMITED FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH
IS ALSO A FUNCTION OF CURRENT LEVEL OF BILATERAL TRADE.
MOST SOVIET TOURISM ELSEWHERE ABROAD IS RELATED TO SOME
USEFUL GOAL, E.G., LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY SOVIET DOCTORS,
TEACHERS AND OTHER SPECIALISTS. HOWEVER, U.S. TOURIST
MARKET OFFERS FEW SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. U.S. FIRMS ARE LESS
WILLING THAN OTHERS TO RECEIVE SOVIET TOURISTS AND THIS
ALSO BEARS ON THE PROBLEM. MOREOVER, AMONG SOVIET TOURISTS
TO U.S. THERE IS FEAR OF VIOLENCE AND CRIME. INDIVIDUAL
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SOVIET TOURISTS THINK U.S. IS NOT BEST PLACE TO VISIT. (AMBASSADOR INTERVENED TO SAY, "WE HAVE OUR PROBLEMS, BUT LET'S NOT EXAGGERATE THEM.")

BASKET III

- A. HUMAN CONTACTS.
- 1) FAMILY REUNIFICATION. SOVIET
 RECORD WAS BETTER IN 1976 THAN 1975. PROCESSING PERIOD WAS
 SHORTER AND, TAKING CASES INVOLVING DEPARTURE FOR U.S.
 AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES TOGETHER, SOVIET DECISION WAS
 POSITIVE IN 98.4 PERCENT OF ALL CASES. SOVIETS HAVE FOUND
 THAT REPRESENTATION LISTS PROVIDED BY EMBASSY ARE NOT RPT
 NOT DOCUMENTS WHICH REALLY DEMONSTRATE WHO WANTS TO DO
 WHAT. SINCE THESE LISTS ARE OFTEN INACCURATE, SOVIET SIDE
 CONSIDERS AS "CONCRETE" DOCUMENTS ONLY DECLARATIONS MADE
 BY INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES.
- 2) NOTIFICATION OF BASIS FOR REFUSAL. KORNIYENKO MADE NO COMMENT.
- 3) FACILITATION OF BINATIONAL MARRIAGES.
 IN 1976 MAJORITY OF SUCH CASES WERE RESOLVED. EXCEPTIONS
 DO EXIST AND WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS
 INCLUDING PHENOMENON OF FICTITIOUS, CONTRIVED MARRIAGES.
 (AMBASSADOR SAID HE THOUGHT THESE WERE RARE.
 KORNIYENKO REPLIED, "MAYBE, BUT THEY STILL HAPPEN".) IN
 ANY EVENT, ALTHOUGH SOVIET DECISION IS GENERALLY
 POSITIVE, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT APPROVAL WAS NOT
 RPT NOT AUTOMATIC. (FOR CONVERSATION ON MCCLELLAN CASE,
 SEE MOSCOW 2890.)
- 4) TRAVEL FOR PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
 REASONS. MFA'S CONSULAR ADMINISTRATION WILL SHORTLY BE
 READY TO NEGOTIATE. SOVIETS HOPE U.S. SIDE IS READY TO
 SHORTEN PROCESSING PERIOD. SOVIETS FRANKLY DO NOT
 UNDERSTAND NEED FOR MULTIPLE-ENTRY EXIT VISAS FOR STUDENTS AND
 JOURNALISTS. (AMBASSADOR SAID THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN
 CONSULAR NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN.)
- 5) RECIPROCAL ABOLITION OF TRAVEL CONTROLS. KORNIYENKO MADE NO COMMENT. CONFIDENTIAL

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6) TRAVEL BY REPRESENTATIVES OF
SOVIET SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS. BY DENYING VISAS TO SOVIET
TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. HAS VIOLATED LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF FINAL ACT. (REJECTING THAT ASSERTION, AMBASSADOR
SAID THAT FROM A PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT IF THE USSR COULD
COMMEND ITSELF TO GEORGE MEANY AND U.S. TRADE UNION
MOVEMENT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. KORNIYENKO COUNTERED
THAT EVEN THOUGH MEANY APPROVED SUCH VISITS "THERE ARE
OTHERS, FOR INSTANCE, LEONARD WOODCOCK. EVEN THEN, OUR
AUTO TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES DIDN'T GET VISAS.")

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B. IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION:

1) FREER AND WIDER DISSEMINATION BY RADIO. U.S. MAINTAINS ITS FOREIGH BROADCASTING IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH LETTER AND SPIRIT OF FIRST ACT. SOVIETS INSIST THAT RADIO LIBERTY, RADIO FREE EUROPE AND CERTAIN VOA BOARDCASTS DO NOT RPT NOT ACCORD WITH FINAL ACT, I.E., SUCH BROADCASTS DO NOT PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLES. TO THE CONTRARY, TEY USE TRAITORS AND ARE HOSTILE TO USSR. (REJECTING THIS, AMBASSADOR SAID OUR POSITION ON RL AND RFE WAS SO WELL KNOWN THERE WAS NO NEED TO REPEAT IT. HOWEVER, HE WAS DISTRUBED BY KORNIYEKO'S REFERENCE TO VOA. IF KORNIYENKO COULD CITE SPECIFIC EVIDENCEOF VOA VIOLATING THE FINAL ACT. AMBASSADOR WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. KORNIYENKO SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE CONCERTE EXAMPLES.) 2) DISSEMINATION OF PRINTED, NON-PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORIES. SOVIET SIDE FACILITATES DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. BOOKS (ART, TECHNICAL AND TRANSLATIONS), MANY MORE TIME NUMBER OF SOVIET BOOKS DISTRUBUTED IN U.S. (AMBASSADOR SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO NUMBERS GAME. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED SOVIETS WERE NOT PREPARED TO LET US OPEN COMMERCIAL BOOK STORES. AND HOPED THAT SOMEDAY OUR BOOKS COULD ENTER USSR

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FREELY. HOWEVER, THAT WAS SOVET PROBLEM AND WE RESPECTED THEIR SOVERIENGTY.)

3) MEETING OF EMBASSY REPRESETATIVES

AND MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNIGA OFFICIALS TO INCREASE AVAILABILITY
THROUGH NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS OF PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS.

IN 1076 SOVIET DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN PERIODICAL

IN 1976 SOVIET DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN PERIODICAL

PUBLICATIONS WAS THREE TIMES LARGER THAN BEFORE. SUFFICIENT

CONTACT EXISTS THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS. THEREFORE

THERE IS NO NEED FOR EMBASSY INVOLBEMENT.

4) ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBRARIES AND

READING ROOMS. THERE IS NO NEED FOR READING ROOMS.

5) TELEVISION BROADCASTS. KORNIYENKO

MADE NO COMMENT.

6) INPROVEMENT OF JOURNALISTS'

WORKING CONDITIONS. U.S. PROPOSAL IS A REPLAY OF SOVIET PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 1976. SOVIETS ARE READY TO DISCUSS THIS.

7. BELGRADE MEETING;

SOVIETS WELCOME US STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS
TO MEET IN BELGRADE AS ANOTHER POSITIVE STEP TOWARD RELAXING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS TAKE EXCEPTION
TO US TERMINOLOGY "REVIEW MEETINGS". FINAL ACT CALLS
FOR "PROCEEDING TO A THROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS." THERE
IS NO NEED FOR MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS OR BALANCE SHEET
APPROACHES, RAHTER WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN EXCHANGE OF
OPINIONS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE FURTHER. EACH COUNTRY CAN
OF COURSE, MAKE A PRESENTATION ON ITS OWN IMPLEMENTATION.
THE GOAL SHOULD BE THE ACHEVEMENT OF POSITIVE, CO STRUCTIVE
RESULTS. (THE AMBASSADOR AGRED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE
CONSTRUTIVE AND FORWARD -LOOKING. HOWVER, WE WOULD BE
COMPELLED TO REVIEW COMPLIEANCE "OUR OWN AS WELL AS YOURS,"
BUT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.)

8. MISCELLANEUOUS --LIVING CONDITIONS FOR SOVIETS EMIGRANTS TO US: AT ONE POINT KORNEYENKO REFERRED TO A LENGHTY CONFIDENTIAL

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NYT ARTICLE ON DIFFICULTIES SOME SOVIET EMIGRANTS TO US ENCOUNTER IN RESETTLING. HE ASKED IMPISHLY HOW DID WE CONCERN OURSELVES WITH RESOLVING THESE PROBLEMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT, WHICH STATES THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES REGARDING EMPLOYMENT. HE SAID "WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION NOBODY CARES." (AMBASSADOR REMINDED HIM THAT OURS WAS A FREE SOCIETY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IN THE POSITION TO GUARANTEE EMPLYMENT, BUT WAS TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE OPPORUTNITY TO WORK, TO LIVE AS ONE DESIRES AND WITH WHO ONE DESIRES.

MOS IMMIGRANT STO THE US WERE REASONABLY WELL SATISFIED.)

9. AMBASSADOR'S CONCLUDING REMARKS:

--REFERRIN TO KORNIYENKO'S REMARKS THAT WE SEEMED TO PLACE DISAPPROPRIATE EMPAHASIS ON BASKET III, AMBASSADOR ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE JUST AS INTERESTED IN SECURITY AS SOVIETS. POSSIBILY OUR POSITION ON THIS SCORE HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED. OUR EMPHASIS ON BASKET III REFLECTED OUR DESIRE FOR MORE IMPROVEMENT.

--RE TRADE BARRIERS, IT SHOULD BE CLAR TO
SOVIETS THA BOTH PRESIDENT FORD AND CARTER WERE OPPOSED
TO THE JACKSON-VANOK AMENDMENT AND TO THE STEVENSON
AMENDMENT. IT WAS TRUE THAT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO AMEND
OR ELIMANATE THIS LEGISLATIONBUT THAT WAS BECAUSE OF AN UNFORABALBE
CLIMATE RESULTING FROM CERTAIN POSTURES ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT

HOPEFULLY, WE WOULD MAKE THESE CHANGES THIS YEAR OR NEXT, BUT THAT DEPENDED ON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. THE CONGRESS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVINCED OF THE NECISSITY FOR SUCH MOVES.

--REGARDING KORNIYENKO'S REFERENCE TO HE NUCLEAR
NON FIRST USE PROPOSAL, THE AMBASSADOR SAID FRANKLY HE
DID NOT THINK THIS WAS A VERY HELPFUL WAY TO PROCEED.
OUR POSITION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR BY THE NATO STATEMENT.
--AS FOR BREZHNVE'S PROPOSALS ON ENERGY,
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ENVIRONMENTA AND TRANSPORTATION CONDERENCES, THEY WERE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE USG. SOVIETS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAD JUST HAD A MAJOR CHANGE OF ADMINSTATION. THE SOVIETS WOULD GET THIER ANSWER IN DUE TIME.
--PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RETURN TO DETIALED DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR DECEMBER DEMARCHE HAD BEEN EXAMINED BY WASHINGON.

--THIS SESSION WITH KORNIYENKO HAD BEEN

INTERESTING AND USEFUL. HIS FRANKNESS WAS APPRECIATED.

10. IN GENERAL, THE DISCUSSION WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND RELTIVELY RESTRAINED. PREDICATLY, KORNIYENKO REPEATED MANY ASSERTIONS HE HAD MADE DURING DECEMBER 14 EXCHANGE (REFTEL), BUT DROPPED HIS EARLIER PEJORATIVE REFERENCE TO CONGRESIONALLY MODERATED COMMISSION ON CSCE AND THREW US A FEW PSOITIVE CURMBS, AND LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE. BUT SOVET PERFORMANCE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD OVER PAST TWO MONGS (E.G., EXPLUSIONOF AP CORRESPONDET KRIMSKY, ARESTS OF GINZBURG ET AL, HEATED EXCHANGES ON SAKHAROV, SOVIET MEDIA RESPONSE TO US HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, AND REPEATED DETENTION OF FAYN ET AL DURING THEIR RECENT ATTEMPTS TO ENTER EMBASSY) HAS BEEN DISTINCTLY RETROGRADE. WE CONCLUDE THERE IS LITTLE PRODUCTIVE WE CAN EXPECT FROM SOVIETS BETWEEN NOW AND

BELGRADE MEETING, AT LEASE IN THIS FIELD BUT WE SHOULD KEEP THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE. TOON

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